This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible-as this essay hopes to illustrate-then this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.
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PR126_2_04Cornell_1pp.pdf NICOLAS C ORNELL 1 in some sense, releases that person from one's censure without, at the 2 same time, releasing her from the duty that she owes. 3 The phenomenon of preemptive forgiving is worth thinking about 4 for at least two reasons. First, there are rich philosophical questions about 5 the nature of forgiveness. But the philosophical discussion has almost 6 entirely assumed that forgiving occurs exclusively in response to past 7 actions of others. If preemptive forgiving is a real phenomenon, attend- 8 ing to it may alter how we think about forgiveness. There is also a second 9 reason for thinking about preemptive forgiving, unrelated to the litera-10 ture on forgiveness. The possibility of preemptively forgiving illuminates 11 a gap between directed duties and accountability. Preemptive forgiving 12 suggests that one can waive one's complaint-one's standing to hold 13 another accountable-without necessarily waiving the relevant duties 14 that one is owed. In other words, preemptive forgiving sheds light on 15 the nature of certain normative concepts, which matters for everything 16 from broad philosophical accounts of interpersonal morality to concrete 17 doctrinal questions in the law. 18 The essay proceeds in three parts. Part 1 examines what I take to be 19 the two basic arguments against the possibility of preemptively forgiving. 20 One argument focuses on the connection between forgiving and grant- 21 ing permission, the other on the connection between forgiving and 22 emotion. I begin with in-depth explication of these arguments because, 23 if preemptive forgiving is possible, then much can be learned from turn- 24 ing these arguments on theirheads. As they say, one person's modus ponens 25 is another person's modus tollens. 26 Part 2 consists of my argument that preemptive forgiving is poss-27 ible. I offer a series of examples and arguments to suggest that preemptive 28 forgiving can occur without collapsing into a grant of permission. I hope 29 to suggest that preemptive forgiving can serve important purposes. I then 30 reject the reply that these apparent instances of preemptive forgiving are 31 actually instances of promising to forgive in the future. 32 Part 3 sketches, roughly, some of the implications that preemptive 33 forgiving may hold both for philosophical understanding of forgiving 34 and relational normativity as well as concrete practical issues like liability 35 waivers. The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving 1 giving can occur only after the act that is forgiven. The following state-2 ment from Horsburgh (1974, 269) is representative: " There can be no 3 question of forgiveness unless an injury has been inflicted on somebody 4 by a moral agent. There must be something to forgive." But this expla- 5 nation is insufficient unless it is coupled with some reason for thinking 6 that future actions cannot be part of our metaphysics. Certainly there 7 must be something to forgive, but why can't the something be something 8 that hasn't happened yet? 9 Ultimately, I mean to argue that we can forgive an action that is yet 10 to be performed. The main argument for this claim, however, does not 11 come until the next section of the essay. I forgive (now) the impatient 12 reader if she wishes (in the future) to skip ahead to that portion of the 13 essay. Before turning to examples of preemptive forgiving, however, I 14 want to discuss the arguments for the view that forgiving is necessarily 15 retrospective. 16 17 
Forgiving and Permission

18
There is an argument-what I will call the First Argument against Preemptive
19
Forgiving -that, if pressed, I believe many philosophers would be 20 inclined to endorse. David Londey (1986, 4) offers a particularly nice 21 articulation of the basic idea: 22 23 Forgiving someone for something is quite a complex act, as can be seen 24 from the fact that the utterance "I forgive you for doing A" only has its full 25 intended illocutionary force if a number of conditions are satisfied. In the 26 first place, it must be the case that you have already done A-I cannot 27 forgive you for what you have not done (although I can either predict that I shall forgive you if you do A, or give you permission to do it, thus remov- 28 ing any question of having to forgive you for it in the future). 29 
30
The thought here is that forgiving must occur ex post. Anything before- 31 hand would be something other than forgiveness-perhaps permission 32 or prediction. 33 The argument purports to stem from the nature of our moral 34 concepts. The claim is not merely that, as a contingent and empirical 35 matter, acts of forgiving come after the wrongful acts that they reference. 36 Rather, it is the conceptual claim that an act cannot be an act of forgiving 37 if it precedes the wrongful act that it references. 38 Why think that forgiving is necessarily retrospective? The 39 thought-exemplified by Londey-is that forgiving would cease to be 40 forgiving if it occurred beforehand. Prospective forgiving is impossible NICOLAS C ORNELL 1 because that conceptual space is already occupied by other forms of 2 interpersonal address. In particular, I will focus on the claim that pro- 3 spective forgiving would collapse into granting permission. The thought 4 is that forgiving operates as a form of release, but releasing someone 5 beforehand would constitute granting permission, not forgiveness. emptive forgiving is supplanted by granting permission. 1 
7
The connection between granting permission and forgiving is 8 natural. Both, it seems, can be performatives. 2 Both involve changing that utterance changes what is permissible for you to do. That is, saying 12 it makes the world different; it is not merely reportive. Similarly, when I 13 say, "I forgive you for fing," under the proper conditions, that utterance 14 makes things different between us. It alters our moral relationship. 15 Not only are forgiving and granting permission both performa- 16 tives; they both appear to effect somewhat similar alterations in the moral 17 landscape. Both, for example, can sometimes be accomplished by saying, perspective, permission operates to release one from a duty. Of course, 22 for permission to release one from a duty, the duty in question must be 23 owed to another in a manner that correlates with a Hohfeldian claim-right. pardon. This is just inherent in the word 'pardon', and it limits the president even though 37 the Pardon Clause says nothing more explicit about it" (Kalt 2012, 44). 38 2. Austin (1962) never lists "I forgive" as a performative, though he does countenance similar utterances like "I accept your apology " and "I pardon." The claim that 39 forgiving can be a performative has been defended by Pettigrove (2012) overcome our resentment, we will have to decide whether it is better to be 8 honest with the offender or to offer him the peace of mind that he might 9 gain from hearing us say "I forgive you." 10 Holmgren makes it sound like, whatever the illocutionary force of for-11 giving might be, the attitude of forgiving is conceptually prior. To utter 12 "I forgive you" without the attitudinal shift is not "honest." 13 This assumption that the attitudinal shift, and not the utterance, 14 constitutes "true" forgiving-an essential premise of the Second Argu-15 ment-strikes me as severe. It precludes the more neutral position that 16 "either can be considered manifestations of forgiveness and, depending 17 on the circumstances, exercising one of these is not inferior to exercising 18 both" (Norlock 2009, 97) . In a range of circumstances, forgiving apart 19 from an attitudinal shift serves important purposes. Sometimes, the 20 speech act will precede changing our attitudes and serve as a first step 21 along the way. We may want our child to say "I forgive you," then later 22 remind him that he forgave the person that he is now treating resentfully. 23 On other occasions, the speech act may have important effects in terms of 24 welcoming a person back into a group or community. For example, it may 25 be important to declare that one forgives one's coworker so that others in 26 the office can move on, even if one has not gotten over it oneself. It seems 27 unnatural to claim that instances like these are not real cases of forgiving, 28 or are somehow infelicitous forgiving. 29 The Second Argument also turns on another rather strong prem- believes that a partner is going to cheat, resentment is intelligible partly 14 as a response to that merely being a realistic possibility. 15 As I will argue below, I believe that preemptive forgiving is possible 16 and that the Second Argument is false. But this is not to deny its force. to forgive out of a fear that you will be unable to do so later. 13 Third, preemptive forgiving may be a useful mechanism for avoid- 14 ing conflict. 24 One may have a coworker or neighbor who one sees is set 15 on committing a wrong. The resulting tension might be undesirable- 16 because it is awkward or because it would require a waste of energy. Fore- that you believe quite differently than I do.
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A related fourth possibility is that preemptive forgiving may serve 23 as a token of goodwill. A poetic example can be found in one telling of the 24 Scottish story The Lovers of Gudrun. One man says to the old friend with 25 whom he is now in conflict, "Let us never forget . . . the joyous days of old 26 and the love that knit us together. Let us forgive whatever ill the one may 27 have done to the other-yea, let us forgive beforehand whatsoever of 28 wrong may yet fall out between us-so that our love may be remembered 29 of men and not the strife into which we are surely drifting" (Edgar 1907, 30 178). Here, preemptive forgiving is viewed as a way to express goodwill 31 for the purpose of mending a friendship. But the gesture might be equal-32 ly used to build, not just rebuild, a relationship. 33 Fifth, preemptive forgiving may function compassionately to 34 relieve the burdens on a wrongdoer in anticipation of a wrong. We may, 35 in certain circumstances, want to relieve the transgressor from some of 36 37 38 24. Dillon (2001, 72), in a rare discussion of forward-looking forgiveness, describes as "preservative self-forgiveness" a disposition not to form negative evaluations and 39 emotions that would need to be overcome. Dillon's concern is with a disposition or 40 character trait, whereas my concern is an act. contexts, but something similar happens even in interpersonal cases. 8 One can agree to forgive because one is getting something in return. 9 And preemptive forgiving can serve this purpose. 30. This is a bit quick. It seems plausible to say, "I promise to forgive you next week, 34 but right now I cannot." But it is important, in that case, that there is a temporal gap. It 35 preserves some role for the complaint or resentment to play. Similarly, one might say, 36 preemptively, "If you do that, I promise to forgive you within a week." But it seems much 37 more odd to say, "If you do that, I promise to forgive you that very instant." 38 31. To see the point better, consider the two-layer airport promise again. Compare the following: (1) "I promise you that tomorrow, if my wife agrees, I will promise you that I 39 will take you to the airport the following day." (2) "I promise you that tomorrow I will 40 promise you that if it is raining, I will take you to the airport." In (1), the condition is a merely a placeholder to retain the desired conceptual connection. 24 The artificiality of the response is plain when one considers its full 25 implications. Is every waiver of a complaint like this? Is it impossible to 26 forsake one's moral complaint, and possible only to promise not to use it?
27
Note that the same points might apply to waiving a right. Why not say that 28 one never waives a right but only promises not to exercise it? These ques- 29 tions, I believe, highlight the fact that at least one important sense of 30 having a right and having a complaint involves being able, normatively 31 speaking, to do something. When we give up this normative ability, we 32 33 34 condition on making the second promise and the two-layer structure makes some sense. 35 In (2), the condition is on the action being promised, and the two-layer structure is 36 essentially pointless. That is, (2) collapses into a promise to take the person to the airport 37 if it is raining. Now the present question is in what sense is preemptive forgiving con-38 ditional: (1a) "I promise that if you do the wrong, I will promise not to hold it against you" or (2a) "I promise that I will promise that I will not hold it against you if you do the wrong"? 39
If the former, then the two-layer structure has a role to play, but, if the latter, it does not and 40 the conditionality is merely that alluded to in note 18.
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The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving 1 have, in at least one sense, given up the right or complaint. One can, of 2 course, insist on not using the terms in this way but doing so will not 3 change the moral phenomena. What the court is keen to express, here, is that the covenant not to sue 16 should not be conceived as its own separate promise but rather as a 17 release. To allow a separate action for damages would be, as another 18 early court put it, "marking out a crooked path for litigants to travel, 19 and one that was in nowise contemplated by their contract." 41 
Performative and Attitudinal Forgiving
20
The leading case on this issue is a Second Circuit opinion by Judge
21
Friendly. The crucial passage declares: 22 Certainly it is not beyond the powers of a lawyer to draw a covenant not to 23 sue in such terms as to make clear that any breach will entail liability for 24 damages, including the most certain of all-defendant's litigation 25 expense. Yet to distill all this out of the usual formal covenant would be 26 going too far; its primary function is to serve as a shield rather than as a 27 sword. . . . In the absence of contrary evidence, sufficient effect is given the 28 usual covenant not to sue if, in addition to its service as a defense, it is read 29 tive forgiving may thus provide a window into the complexity of the 23 relational normative concepts that we use on a day-to-day basis. 24 25 
